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1. Introduction
This essay uses the analytical instrument of Political Economy in
order to identify the main factors of the problems associated with
the institutional reform required by the historical challenge of en-
larging the European Union to include the countries of the East.
Nevertheless,  the  decision-making  problems  and  the  difficulties
for  advancing  in  the  process  of  integration  and  increasing  the
powers of the European Community have been almost a constant
feature of its history. The theory that will be maintained in this es-
say is that the previous models are, to a large degree, obsolete and
that the classical  “integration process” has reached a  critical point
and constitutional limits, which make a qualitative change of import-
ance in the system of community government indispensable. Due
to the large amount of theoretical contributions related to this top-
ic, we only will refer to the most important ones within the avail-
able  academic  literature.  In  particular  we took  into  account  the
works of (Armstrond and Bulmer, 1998),  (Hix, 1998)  and (Sand-
holtz and Stone Sweet, 1998) in relation to the governance in the
EU. In reference to the decision-making process in the EU we shall
refer to the works of (Scharpf, 1994a), (Peterson, 1995a), (Richard-
son, 1996a, 1996c) and (Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis, 1999).
The impossibility of extending, due to a simple matter of quant-
ity, the present composition of community institutions leads once
more to the decision-making problems that are characteristic of the
opening-up of new stages in the process of European integration.
The possible dilemma between deepening and enlarging has been
faced with the principle of “reinforced integration”; nevertheless, the
reform of the European Community’s institutional system is still a
problem of the first magnitude in order to facilitate both the devel-
opment of the Union and the unavoidable challenge of its extension
to the countries of the East.
The remaining part of the paper will be structured in the follow-
ing sections: In section 2 we define demand integration and supply
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integration functions, in section 3 we remark the constraints in the
supply side by the Government, in section 4 we warn the existence
of constitutional limits in the integration process, finally in section
5 we establish the main conclusions.
2. A  Constitutional  Model  of  the  European  Union:  Integration
Supply  and  Demand
The constitutional choices regarding the advisability of support-
ing the integration process are based on the balance between the
perceptions of the benefits of increasing integration and the costs
resulting from joint supranational action. The former are the most
evident aspects of the integration process and are the ones that
have always been highlighted by European movements and institu-
tions. Nevertheless, the latter and their main components are key
elements in order to understand the factors underlying the integ-
ration processes and their constitutional design. Related literature
in  this  topic  are  those  of  (Putnam,  1988),  (Moravcsik,  1994)
(Grieco, 1995), (Pierson, 1996), (Cecchini, Catinat and Jacquemin,
1998), (Caporaso, 1998), (Hooghe and Marks, 1999).
2.1 The  Costs  Function  of  the  Joint  Supranational  Action  and  Be -
nefits  of the  Increasing  Integration  Process
On the  fiftieth  anniversary  of  the  Schuman Declaration  (Fon-
taine, 2000) it  seems unnecessary to underline the positive ele-
ments of constructing a democratic community, whose rules dis-
cipline the exercise of the governments’ powers. As Jean Monnet
highlighted, the objective is to surpass mere international cooper-
ation,  creating  a  “fusion  of  interests”  that  surpasses  the  mere
maintenance of its balance, so that by sharing areas of sovereignty
an institutional  system may be created  that  would  promote  co-
operative strategies based on agreement and on the exercise of
civil and economic rights.
The  international  order  generates  problems  with  a  certain
Hobbes-like  nature  (Buchanan,  1975)  in  the  sense  that  govern-
48 European  Research  Studies,  Volume  V, Issue  (3-4), 2002
ments are faced with a dilemma of individual incentives that pre-
vents them from relinquishing the exercise of pressure. The pres-
sures and counterpressures among governments constitute best-
response  mutual  actions  (Nash-Cournot  equilibriums)  and,  at
worst, they originate escalations of conflict (absence of equilibri-
um), as shown in Figure 1, which represents the respective paths of
moderate  and  accelerated  reactions  that  explain  both  kinds  of
situations.
The same analytical  outline can also be applied  to the needs
generated by development processes and the extension of mar-
kets. Pressure can be understood as one more kind of protection-
ism. The protection intensities are counterbalanced among the dif-
ferent parties and only lead to a useless effort and to an inefficient
compartmentalisation of the market, but again the optimum, relin-
quishing the protection and integration of markets, is an unstable
solution without an institutional structure that disciplines the gov-
ernments’ commitment.
It is not necessary to stress the benefits that community con-
struction and the European Union provide the public and govern-
ments  with.  These  benefits,  which have also and correctly  been
called the “costs of non-Europe”, constitute the positive factor or
the potential benefits of integration that are evaluated by the cit-
izens and by the Governments at the time of deciding whether they
want  to  increase  the  Community’s  powers  and  the  degree  of
European integration.
However,  as  opposed  to this  positive  or  beneficial  factor,  we
should not forget that the creation of an area of supranational de-
cision  making  also  generates  a  negative  or  curbing  factor,  the
costs of Europe itself, which are the result of the difficulties and
problems  of  bringing  together,  under  a  common  jurisdiction,
peoples with different economies, histories and cultures.
The costs resulting from joint supranational action itself are the
losses of individual utility caused by the decisions adopted at this
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level, after the powers have been assigned to the Community by
the member states. Such costs can be divided into two main kinds:
1) external or imposed costs, which are those that result from the
adoption of coactive decisions contrary to our interests. 
2) the  supranational  authority’s  decision-making  costs,  i.e.  the
transaction,  negotiation and voting  costs  required to reach a
decision. 
Both kinds, imposition and decision-making costs, are not in-
dependent of the rules governing the decision-making procedures
nor the starting positions and the distributions of interests within
the different areas of the states committed to the integration pro-
cess. Below we present an adaptation of Buchanan and Tullock’s
model (1962) in order to apply it to the constitutional choices re-
garding the assigning of powers to a supranational authority.
The factors that influence the costs related to the creation, ex-
tension and functioning of supranational institutions are numerous
and complex. Nevertheless, for analytical  purposes, we will con-
sider three main factors or basic variables: political influence, de-
gree of integration and the national heterogeneity.
The  constitutional  dimensions  that  determine  the  decision-
making  processes  within  Europe’s  supranational  institutions  are
combined in what we will call the degree of political influence “P”,
which reflects the capacity of blocking a decision contrary to our
interests. In this sense, political influence varies between two ex-
tremes, 0, when there is no influence over the decisions affecting
us, and 1, when there is complete control in this regard, unanimity
or the right of veto, which enables the blocking of any undesirable
decisions.
Figure 2 represents the basic characteristics of the relationship
between integration costs and the decision-making rules that de-
termine the degree of political influence over the decision-making
process. Two different positions are highlighted, that of the public
in general, represented by unbroken lines, and that of the govern-
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ments in particular, represented by dotted lines. In both cases, the
expected imposed costs are higher the lower the degree of influ-
ence in order to avoid a decision contrary to our interests. At the
limit when the political influence tends towards zero, the expected
costs of an arbitrary dictatorship tend towards infinity. On the oth-
er hand, the expected costs of imposition decrease as the capacity
for blocking a decision contrary to our interests increases and, at
the limit for the case of unanimity, “P=1”, they are zero. However,
in the case of  the public,  the decision-making costs (null in the
case of an arbitrary dictatorship) increase as the degree of political
influence increases and, for very inclusive rules close to unanimity,
the decision-making costs increase rapidly, tending towards infin-
ity.  Consequently,  the  optimum situation,  that  which  minimizes
both kinds of costs, is precisely the one that corresponds to the
lower vertex of the curve representing the total cost for the public,
P*.
The situation in the case  of  governments  is different  for two
reasons: 1) firstly, due to the number; since the number of govern-
ments  involved  is  small,  the  costs  of  the  negotiation  processes
with rules that are very inclusive, verging on unanimity, do not be-
come  infinite,  even  when  higher  than  desired,  and 2)  secondly,
since governments are accountable to the public (parliaments and
elections), the inconsistent exercising of the right of veto and the
blocking of the decision-making process generates political costs
that tend to curb the costs resulting from unanimity or decision-
making rules verging on it. As a result, the curve representing the
total  costs  for  governments  reaches  its  minimum in  an  area  of
political influence that is a lot higher and verges on unanimity (or
very qualified majorities).
Such conclusions can also be applied in order to analyse the ef-
fect of quantity on the decision-making institutions; as the number
of governments increases, the curve representing the costs of joint
supranational  action rises  and the efficient solution requires the
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reduction of the inclusiveness of the decision-making rule, moving
it away from unanimity, with the resulting loss of political influ-
ence, which is extremely undesirable for governments. 
Let us now see how the levels of national heterogeneity affect the
costs of joint supranational action, which involves considering the form
of the curves of total costs according to the degree of national hetero-
geneity. It is clear that the higher the perception of the degree of het-
erogeneity,  the higher the expected costs  of  imposition,  which will
therefore require decision-making rules that are more inclusive, closer
to unanimity –which means that the minimum total costs will increase
with the level of heterogeneity and the efficient levels of political influ-
ence will approach 1.When the level of homogeneity is very low, the
minimum of the costs is attained precisely at unanimity and is con-
sidered to be very high. Joint action should be limited to what is abso-
lutely necessary and its basis should be very close to inter-govern-
mentalism in the decision-making procedure. As the supranational ho-
mogeneity decreases, the expected costs of imposition also decrease
and this  enables  less inclusive decision-making rules,  whose lower
total costs require greater degrees of integration and more suprana-
tional powers, since the balance between the benefits and costs of the
joint supranational action are more and more favourable.
As far as coexistence under supranational jurisdiction increases
the degree of homogeneity, a process of cost displacement is pro-
duced  that  promotes  new demands  for  assigning  power  to  the
supranational authorities. This is the essence of the self-cumulat-
ive process of  the “Monnet Method” and of the gradual  logic of
successive steps in European construction.
The problems arising from enlargement can be considered in a
similar way, since the effect of increasing the size and number –as
well as the corresponding heterogeneity- involves an effect similar
to that of reducing the degree of homogeneity: i.e. an increase in
expected costs and a rise in the inclusiveness and caution of the
decision-making processes.
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Precisely  for  these  reasons,  the  principle  of  flexibility  and
strengthened integration is a guarantee of importance, since it en-
ables  a  closer  circle  of  integration  among  the  members  with  a
higher degree of national homogeneity and it facilitates the con-
struction of a leading group of countries promoting the integration
process in concentric waves from a central nucleus.
2.2 Integration  Demand
The evaluation of both factors (benefits and costs) by the cit-
izens (the public in general and its different interest groups: work-
ers, businessmen, economic sectors, functionaries, etc) generates
what we may call the “integration demand” (Faíña 1991), i.e. the cor-
respondence  between  the  levels  of  integration  that  the  public
wants according to the degree  of national homogeneity  and the
risks and problems that this may generate in a common organiza-
tion. 
We have to take into account that between the degrees of integ-
ration and the political influence there is a dependence relation. This
dependence  arises  from the  limitations  that  de  decision-making
problem with a very inclusive vote rule imposes on the amount of
decisions that can be reached in a certain period of time. High de-
grees of integration implies the adoption of a vast number of har-
monising decisions in short periods of time. This means the neces-
sity of reduced the inclusiveness of the decision rule and to reduce
the political influence (specially the governments) in order to achieve
a relatively high degree of integration.
Thus,  once  we  have  overcome the  critical  threshold,  where  the
profits of the integration process start to balance and overcome its
costs, “h* “, the subjective value of the integration will be the higher the
lower the degree of national heterogeneity will be.
Taking into account the above expression,  we can obtain  the
long-term integration demand that is linked to the reduction of the
national heterogeneity.  We define it  as a long-term correspond-
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ence between the degree of integration that the citizens wish and
the levels of political influence that the citizens would accept on
the supranational institutions. This relation is described in the fol-
lowing  graph  (Figure  3)  where  we  offer  the  existing  relation
between the different values of the political influence and the level
of integration that is wished in the collective supranational action. 
The central idea of the “Monnet method” points out that Europe
cannot be constructed suddenly,  nor under the mere impulse of
great ideals,  but rather  little by little,  creating and progressively
broadening  the  common  bonds  of  interest  and  the  actual  and
rightful  solidarity  among the European people.  This seems sub-
stantially correct and highlights two fundamental characteristics of
the demand  for European  integration:
• On the one hand,  it  considers  the costs  of  integration  itself,
since when the degree of national homogeneity is high, any at-
tempt at sudden unification could cause such high costs that
would make it impossible.
• On the other hand, it highlights the “self-accumulative” and “self-
driving”  nature  of  the  integration  demand.  If  at  the  different
levels of integration, regardless of their limited extent initially, a
legal framework with a view to stability  and a set  of  common
rules in one or more sectors are created, their action regarding
the different behaviours and individual decisions will reduce the
degree of national heterogeneity. This harmonizing process re-
duces the costs of unification and generates a demand for great-
er levels of integration, giving rise to a self-propelled spiral of in-
tegration that would converge towards an economic and political
union under different confederate or even federal forms.
Nevertheless, the “gradualist optimism” that seems to be impli-
cit in certain conceptions of the European integration process does
not deserve much credibility. Not even from the sole perspective of
integration demand can a mechanical  process  be proposed.  The
constitutional  decisions  and support  for  the  integration  systems
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are not independent of their systems of rights, nor of the balance
and justice of their institutional rules and balance.
2.3 Integration  Supply
However, progress in integration does not only depend on its
demand, since neither the public in general nor its different pro-
fessional sectors and interest groups can produce the constitution-
al  changes  involved  in  subjecting  governments  to  a  system  of
supranational assigning of sovereign spheres to be jointly admin-
istered:  The  capacity  to  promote  this  process,  the  supply  of
European  integration, still corresponds almost exclusively to central
governments.
Central governments, due to the constitutional structure of au-
thority, have wide-ranging powers of monopoly in the field of the
reform of treaties and are present in the Community’s basic de-
cision-making centres. They are the filters through which all com-
munity initiatives have to pass in order to be successful. The calcu-
lations  about  costs  and  benefits  of  the  progress  in  integration
made by the central governments from their constitutional position
in the  Community  and in  the  representative  democracies  of  the
member states determine another basic coordinate of the process
of European integration: the “integration supply”,  i.e.  the corres-
pondence  between  the  levels  of  integration  and the  degrees  of
control and influence over the community institutions sought by
the  governments  according  to  their  own  calculus  on  the  utility
maximization.
The logical analysis of the central governments’ integration de-
cisions (Frey 1984 and Vaubel 1986), taking into account their as-
pirations and determining factors in a representative democracy,
reveals a certain degree of pessimism regarding the difficulties of
the integration process in a political-economic  union (Faíña and
Puy 1988):
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• At the initial levels of integration, where it is possible to operate
over a wide-ranging basis of intergovernmental unanimity, it is
probable that the integration supply will even exceed the de-
mand and that it will mainly be the central governments them-
selves that will initially promote the integration process.
• Nevertheless, once the process goes beyond its initial stages and
greater and more solid levels of integration are demanded, the
situation changes and supply restrictions appear. High levels of
integration are incompatible with the rule of unanimity in the in-
tergovernmental organ and the decision-making processes have
to be streamlined with rules, increasingly less inclusive and fur-
ther removed from the veto and easy blocking minorities.  The
high decision costs of unanimity and of very inclusive decision
rules (blocking coalitions are easily generated) hinders the adop-
tion, in minimally efficient conditions, of the greater volume of
supranational decisions required in the advanced phases of the
process. As the majority decisions arise and become more wide-
spread,  the  central  governments  become  more  stubborn  and
cautious, since they are afraid of the high political costs of been
obliged to carry out decisions imposed by other institutions and
by their partners as regards matters of great importance. But in
turn, as the level of power of the community system is extended,
there also arise limitations due to the governments’ capacity of
constitutional supply: the capacity and constituent legitimacy in
order to increase the power of the supranational system in ab-
sence of appropriate citizen representation and participation. The
conclusion is that, in the long term, all integration processes will
have to face increasing supply restrictions.
Such restrictions do not involve any determinism as regards the
final evolution of the integration processes. The representative gov-
ernments have wide-ranging degrees of freedom in order to attain
their interests, but they also have to face the restriction of maintain-
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ing their probability of re-election above a critical level. The final
result will therefore depend on the force and intensity of the de-
mand for  integration  and  the  transparency  and efficiency  of  the
“political markets”.
3. Decision- Making  Rules  and Constitutional  Choices  of Suprana -
tional  Integration
3.1 Supply  Deficits  and Integration  Decisions
Beyond the first steps in the integration process, where the in-
tergovernmental elements of the decision-making process enable
the central governments to advance in integration with a low risk
of expected costs, restrictions in the integration supply begin to
arise  on  the  part  of  the  central  governments.  This  is  the  case
shown in Figure 4 below.
The rising curve represents the evaluation of the benefits of a
new step forward in joint supranational  action and the two “U”-
shaped curves represent the total costs of a new step forward in
integration  according  to  the  estimates  of  the  public,  unbroken
curve, and the central governments, dotted-line curve. The central
governments, with a more cautious estimate, fear the costs of im-
position and decide to cede a very small part of their political in-
fluence, “Pg”; the balance of this position is high for the govern-
ments but very low for the public in general, who cannot take ad-
vantage of the benefits of the increased integration.
The integration demand clashes with a supply restriction and it is
therefore impossible, in the short term, to reach point “P*”, where a
greater transfer of political power enables the public to take full ad-
vantage of the benefits of integration.
Situations of this kind have been frequent in the history of the
European Community. The procedures for their solution have al-
ways been the same, generating an idea that has produced a cur-
rent of public opinion in their favour that not even the most recal-
citrant governments have been able to successfully oppose for a
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long time. The case of the last long wave of integration that arose
from the idea of the domestic market and its logical consequence,
monetary union, seems to indicate such.
3.2 Constitutional  Limits  in the  Process  of Integration
The previous evolution has most probably promoted European
construction at the first levels of integration. Nevertheless, the old
structure, according to which the central governments used their
exclusive competence in the supply of European integration in or-
der to shape the Community to suit themselves, with the intergov-
ernmental organ at the centre of the decision-making processes,
has reached its  own constitutional  limits,  due to the integration
process’ maturity and progress. This is illustrated in Figure 5 be-
low, which shows the process’ constitutional limits.
The  aforementioned  figure  shows  five  successive  levels  or
stages of integration. Beyond the first steps in which the integra-
tion supply exceeds the public’s  integration demand, the supply
evolves in step-like fashion along the broken line of arrows due to
the impulse or pull of demand (Downs 1957).
The maturity and progress of the process leads to a stage or
phase of integration (shown in the figure as I4, Economic and Mon-
etary Union) in which the supply becomes permanently rigid. What
is the reason for this? Unlike previous situations, two constitutional
factors prevent the continuation of the process based on the previ-
ous model of supply impulse:
• Firstly, the supply becomes rigid because it is at the limit of its
own constituent capacity. To what extent can the simple proced-
ure of reforming the treaties, without strengthening the constitu-
tional dimension, give rise to a closer union?
• Secondly, the very demand for integration becomes vertical and
loses its driving force. This is so because at the level of important
transfers of power to supranational  jurisdiction,  the loss of the
central governments’ political influence required in order to pro-
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gress with integration also involves a loss of the representation
and influence of national interests on the part of the public, who
do not have any other national authorities of representation in the
Community system.
The  risks  of  continuing  with  integration,  without  promoting
other mechanisms of representation and connection with national
interests,  could be very high and the positive  impulse  of  public
opinion in the member states could be lacking. The best solution
to the problem consists in completing the loss of influence of the
governments  in  the  Council  with  an increase  in  the  cooperation
with other political authorities in the member states (national par-
liaments and regional authorities), thereby producing the necessary
constitutional change: ending the central governments’ monopoly
in the representation of the member states’ national interests.
This  solution  is  totally  analogous  as  regards  the  problems
arising from enlargement and the loss of political influence due to
the community institutions’ adaptation to a large number of coun-
tries.
4. Concluding  Remarks
The main conclusion that is reached by the analysis of the con-
stitutional choices of citizens and governments using our political-
economic model, is the necessity for breaking the central govern-
ments’ monopoly in the representation of national interests of the
Union’s member states,  both at a constitutional  level  (reform of
treaties) and in the institutional balance (decision making). 
The reactivation  of  the  “European  integration  process”  in  the
eighties has led to a degree of maturity in the transfers of power
and has become so widespread that it has reached a point where it
is  impossible  to  continue without  breaking  the  “central  govern-
ments’ monopoly” in the representation of the member states’ na-
tional interests. The impressive progress made in the last fifteen
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years has led: 1) in the case of the transfers of power, to the Single
European Act and the unification of the domestic market and the
Maastricht Treaty and European Economic and Monetary Union and
2) in the case of enlargement, from the Community of 9 to the new
15-member  one,  including  German  reunification.  Nevertheless,
having reached the end of this wave of expansion and deepening
of community powers, new urgent problems have arisen that re-
quire a continuation of the reduction of the unanimity decision-
making procedures in the Council and a reduction in the weight of
the “intergovernmental organ”, as well as those other characterist-
ics of an “international” nature (members of the Commission and
judges according to country, etc).
Due to  the  importance of  the  community  system of  govern-
ment’s powers and functions, it is not sufficient to lighten and fa-
cilitate the Council’s decision-making procedures by means of less
inclusive rules that are further removed from unanimity and block-
ing possibilities; it is also necessary to maintain a suitable “repres-
entation of the national interests” of the member states’ citizens
(whose only representatives are still the central governments). Re-
form should therefore be carried out in the sense of extending the
guarantees and possibilities of participation and influence of the
citizens and their regional and national interests, which involves
the following main reforms, among others: 1) Strengthening citizen
guarantees and rights, 2) Associating national and regional parlia-
ments  to  the  Union’s  decision-making  processes,  possibly  by
means of collaboration with the European Parliament, and 3) In-
creasing  the  participation  of  regional  authorities,  possibly  by
means of the Committee of Regions, in cooperation with other in-
stitutions such as the Parliament and the Commission.
In short,  the objective is not only to limit the influence of the
“inter-governmental” organs and procedures, but the necessary in-
stitutional reform should also find new authorities of cooperation
and participation in order to take into account national and regional
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interests in the Community’s decision-making processes. This in-
volves giving up the principle that the representation of national in-
terests should correspond exclusively to central governments. The
implications have a double dimension: 1) Firstly, as regards the ad-
option of constitutional rules (Reform of Treaties and National Law),
the exclusive and “monopolistic” role of central governments should
be surpassed by means of the Intergovernmental Conference and
representative organs should be linked with greater constituent ca-
pacity, as is the case of the cooperation between the European Par-
liament  and  the  national  parliaments.  The  four-party  Convention
(Council,  Commission,  European  Parliament  and  national  parlia-
ments) that draws up the Constitution of Fundamental Rights is a
magnificent channel for strengthening both the constituent capacity
and the constitutionalization of the Union. 2) Secondly, the reform
should lay the foundations of a new “institutional balance”, where
the representation of “the member states’ national interests” does
not correspond exclusively to the “central governments” and their
organs  of  representation  (Council)  and  administrative  influence
(committees), linking the procedures to national parliaments and re-
gional authorities,  possibly by means of cooperation between the
European  Parliament,  the Commission and the Committee of  Re-
gions.
Finally, the analysis of the factors underlying the constitutional
decisions of the public and the governments and the interrelation
between integration supply and demand, presents a clear conclusion
that,  to  some  extent,  supports  the  federalist  conceptions  of
European construction: The institutional reform required by exten-
sion to the East and the deepening towards political and economic
union cannot be conceived as a constant process of adding success-
ive spheres of sovereignty, assigned by the member states to the
community institutions in order to be jointly administered under the
pre-eminence  of  intergovernmental  organs:  European  Council,
Council of Ministers and their related committees. Both  the  extension
to a large  number  of countries  and  the  construction of the  minimum  political
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union backing  economic  and  monetary  union  require a change  of structure
–perhaps  slow  and  gradual but  decisive-  to put  an  end  to the  central gov-
ernments’  monopoly  in the  Community’s  decision-making  nucleus,  as  re-
gards  both the  reform of treaties  and  the  institutional balance  of power and
decision-making procedures.
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